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Abstract: In this paper five recommendations are given for expanding the 
theoretical and methodological framework of applied social dilemma research:
1.) We should not contend ourselves with identifying causal factors which 
may determine empirical subjects’ decisions in social dilemmas. When looking 
for the ultimate causes of an observed behavior in social dilemmata, we have 
to explain the evolutionary selection value of the decision patterns in 
question; we must not contend ourselves with revealing the the psychic 
mechanisms which caused the observed behavior to happen.
2.) In designing our experiments, we should give more emphasis to experimen­
tal markets rather than to experimental games. In particular we should study 
experimental markets which allow for a dynamical adjustment, because quite 
often the rationality of a behavior can be empirically judged only from such 
a dynamical component. Such experiments will not only be theoretically 
richer, but will permit observing phenomena which would otherwise go un­
detected.
3.) The key to understanding people's decisions in social dilemmata are 
their expectations regarding the decisions of the other players. Therefore, 
a major focus of interest should be measuring these expectations of subjects 
in experiments, and investigating the rationality of these expectations.
4.) As soon as adjustment processes are no more equifinal (because there are 
many possible endpoints, which equally qualify as rational results) the 
rationality of individual decision making as well as of the market dynamics 
as a whole lies in the process itself of reaching some equilibrium. If we 
mean by bargaining any process by which individual players come to a conver­
gence of wishes and offerings, then scrutinizing the rationality of the 
bargaining strategies which on the marketplace the agents apply is the only 
way to investigate the rationality of the results of the whole process.
5.) Once we adopt a process oriented notion of rationality, as outlined, we 
have to put the analysis of our subjects’ bargaining behavior, which means 
the reconstruction of the bargaining strategies, applied by the players, 
into the center stage of experimental social dilemma research. The ex­
perimental design of choice for this analysis are bargaining games between a 
real subject and a group of computer simulated bargaining partners.
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Cooperation within a group, which means collective efforts for the achieve­
ment of a common good, is the very core of human sociality, and is marked by 
two characteristics- First, if successful, it makes everyone in the group 
better off than if left with the alternative individualistic solution to a 
particular problem. Secondly, quite often it is exploitable: from a purely 
individualistic cost-benefit viewpoint, the best choice then is the one 
which allows you to enjoy the fruits of the collective effort without having 
contributed properly to its costs; while the worst choice is the one which 
leaves you alone with the costs for what is collectively enjoyed thereafter, 
if you spent more than would have been necessary for an individualistic
solution for you alone. If we denote with V . . the value of the behavior i in13
an encounter with behavior j, and if we denote cooperative behavior with c 
and non-cooperative behavior with n, then we can express these two charac­
teristics by the following three inequalities:
V > V (la), V > V (lb), and V > V <lc)cc - nn nc - cc nn ~ cn
Any social situation in which either conditions la) and lb), or la) and lc) 
are fulfilled, is a Social Dilemma situation. If all three conditions hold:
V > V > V > V (Id) nc - cc - nn — cn
we have a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), a proper subset of all Social Dilemma. 
Since by simple payoff manipulation either conditions lb) or lc) can be
removed from Id), the PD has been treated in theory as well as in empirical
research as the model for all Social Dilemmata, and we will also do so.
Three basic properties of any PD type of a Social Dilemma can be derived 
from (Id):
(i) V is Pareto-optimal, and V is not; but cc nn
(ii) V is an equilibrium, and V is not; nn cc
(iii) non-cooperation is a dominant strategy; there is no mixed equilibrium.
In Social Dilemma Research we are closer to a paradigmatiral stage of the 
development of science than in many other areas in social psychology and 
microsociology. In order to get even further towards this goal we should not
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only communicate to each other the results of recent experiments. We should 
also exchange ourselves about the fundamentals of our theoretical and ex­
perimental work, in order to come to a gradually more unified basis for 
both. In order to initiate such an exchange, I want to make five recommenda­
tions to aspiring Social Dilemma researchers:
I.
1. We should not contend ourselves with identifying causal factors which may 
determine empirical subjects* decisions in social dilemmas. When looking for 
the ultimate causes of an observed behavior in social dilemmata, we have to 
explain the evolutionary selection value of the decision patterns in ques­
tion; we must not contend ourselves with revealing the the psychic 
mechanisms which caused the observed behavior to happen.
According to the Dutch ethologist Tinbergen, in all empirical behavioral 
sciences there are four principal problems associated with the question 
"Why?": structure, function, ontogeny and evolution.
The dimension "Structure" refers to the physical and psychic mechanisms 
which in an agent's body and mind produce the behavior pattern which we are 
studying.
The dimension "Ontogeny" refers to the development of this machinery within 
the agent’s lifespan. In both dimensions explanations refer to the chain of 
proximate causal effects which finally are producing the manifest behavior 
pattern in question.
"Function", on the other hand, refers to the utility of the behavior in 
question for the agent's chances for survival and reproduction, and there­
fore to the utility of the physiological and psychic mechanisms producing 
this behavior. "Evolution" refers to the forces shaping the phylogeny of 
these mechanisms. In these latter two dimensions explanations are about the 
ultimate causation of the manifest behavior pattern we study.
The general framework of all social dilemma research is as follows: 
Depending on a subject's expectation about what the other players involved 
will do and how they will respond to this subject's own decisions, the 
cooperative option is preferable over the non-cooperative option, or vice
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versa. According to these expectations, people will then make their deci­
sions- These expectations may be influenced by structural factors 
(personality traits; life history; psychobiological factors like sex, age, 
endocrinological status; specific training etc.) or by aspects of the situa­
tion (history of the game; type of decision framing; dimension of 
uncertainty associated with decision problems etc.).
Typically the expected utilities in the sense of Neumann-Morgenstern and the 
stability properties of strategy combinations are either kept constant 
throughout the experiment or are equally modified for all subjects. Then we 
want to observe, how these structural or situational factors modify the sub­
jects' decisions.
Implicit in this general setting is, that we assume all subjects to form 
sensible expectations and to make rational decisions, but that rationality 
means not exactly the same for all subjects in all situations. If we do not 
want to end up at the insinuation, that some people structurally are more 
rational than others, we have to assume that rationality indeed may advise 
different people to behave differently in certain situations, and that there 
may be differences in situations, which are not reflected in the expected 
utilities of the options at stake, but which nevertheless call for different 
choices.
Most social dilemma theory stops here, because of the confusion over the 
type of explanation we are looking for. What makes a Social Dilemma a 
Dilemma, and therefore a problem for behavioral scientists, is the dilemma 
between conflicting decision incentives, and not between conflicting be­
havior mechanisms (as in those experiments when it was tried to 
experimentally produce neuroses in cats: cats were offered food, when the 
cats reached for it, the animals were given a mild electric shock). A Social 
Dilemma is a rationality dilemma, and accordingly, in experimental Social 
Dilemma research we deal with the rationality of real subjects' decisions 
and not with the causality of these decisions.
Following Theodosius Dobzhansky's dictum: "Nothing in the life sciences 
makes sense except in the light of evolution" we should look for the evolu - 
tionary rationality of an observed behavior in such a dilemma: how it adds
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to the organism's survival and reproduction chances. And likewise for inter­
personal differences in observed behavior: maybe different people make 
different choices because maximizing their survival and reproduction chances 
requires them to make different choices.
Let me demonstrate this with three examples:
First take the influence of perceived uncertainty on decision making in a 
Social Dilemma situation. Suleiman and Rapoport (1987) have described a 
sophisticated experimental design entailing various levels of environmental 
uncertainty (net payoff is a random variable with known or unknown mean and 
varying variance) in addition to the social uncertainty {other players' con­
tribution is a random variable with known or unknown mean and varying 
variance). Budescu et al. (1988) have applied this design in various forms 
of a Commons Dilemma, finding an strong impact of environmental uncertainty 
on subjects' behavior in Social Dilemmas: with increased environmental un­
certainty people become more greedy and less concerned about the future of 
the common resource.
A second example: a well known effect in individual decision making, 
described by Kahnemann and Tversky, is that people tend to be risk-averse, 
if they can better their position, but tend to be risk-seeking, if the issue 
is how to avoid a turn of their position to the worse. As a by-product in a 
recent study (Mueller et al. 1987) we found, that while our subjects dis­
played this effect, as expected, in an individual decision making situation, 
this effect vanished in the Social Dilemma group decision making 
situation.
A third example: Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, 1986) have shown that ignorance 
about the probability distribution of an uncertain event (or technically 
speaking: ignorance about a random variable’s probability distribution) adds 
a new dimension of uncertainty to the first-order uncertainty of not knowing 
the actual value, but the probability distribution of a variable. Einhorn 
and Hogarth have used the term "ambiguity" for this new dimension of uncer­
tainty; in experiments people tend to treat ambiguity as additional 
uncertainty. It is possible that there are connections between the findings 
of Budescu et al. and the ones of Einhorn and Hogarth.
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In all three examples, the underlying cognitive processes are closely as­
sociated: how to cognitively process risk perception. A rationality 
explanation in all these examples, in my opinion, would have to use a 
gambler’s ruin model in order to show that if there is a maximal loss 
(death; termination of the genetic lineage):
then getting greedy and focusing on short-term benefits may be 
evolutionarily the most rational strategy in a Commons situation, once en­
vironmental uncertainty rises;
- then Kahnemann's and Tversky’s risk averse/risk seeking behavior may be 
most rational strategy agents can apply in uncertain physical environments; 
on the other hand, maintaining one's reputation and predictability in uncer­
tain social environments may by far offset the advantages of this switching 
from risk-averseness to risk-proneness and back;
- then it can be directly demonstrated that with a greater variance of your 
probability of survival and reproduction chances (with their respective ex­
pectation values unchanged), the chances of death and lineage extinction 
within a given period of time increase (Ellison 1984).
II.
2. In designing our experiments, we should give more emphasis to experimen­
tal markets rather than to experimental games. In particular we should study 
experimental markets which allow for a dynamical adjustment, because quite 
often the rationality of a behavior can be empirically judged only from such 
a dynamical component. Such experiments will not only be theoretically 
richer, but will permit observing phenomena which would otherwise go un­
detected.
Several branches of the social sciences within the framework of their 
respective disciplines not only have developed theoretical models of Social 
Dilemmas, but have developed their own approaches to the experimental test­
ing of these models. Very disturbing, however, is how contradictory the 
results of these innumerable studies are, depending on the choice of the 
experimental setting even though the core of the cooperaton problem is left 
unaltered. Two types of experiments on cooperation for a collective purpose
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display this divergence of results, despite the identical decision problem, 
in an extreme manner. These two types are derived from the two most impor­
tant theoretical approaches to the subject as a whole: welfare economics and 
the theory of games.
The first type of experiment are experimental market transactions over 
public goods; the other are cooperation dilemma games, of which the 
Prisoner's Dilemma is the most prominent example. It has been found time and 
again that people seem to be much less cooperation-minded in the second type 
of experiment than in the first one (for an extensive report, see Stroebe 
and Frey, 1982), despite the fact that both types of experiments embody the 
characteristics of a Social Dilemma, and are therefore equivalent with 
respect to the underlying decision rationality.
In an experimental study (Mueller et al. 1987) we could demonstrate, that 
the confusion over the results of the two types of experiments is mainly 
caused by wrongly equating Free Riding (zero contributions) in the market 
transaction experiments with non-cooperation in the social dilemma games. 
The amount of the collective good provided at the non-cooperative 
equlibrium, however, does not necessarily has to be zero, as we will show. 
Consequently, we contend that the contradictions between the results of the 
two experimental designs can be resolved by an public goods approach, which 
focuses on the distinction between two types of rational behavior, which we 
can label as Group-Welfare behavior versus Individual-Adjustment behavior as 
the general manifestations of cooperative versus non-cooperative behavior. 
Both types of behavior, Group-tfelfare behavior and Individual-Adjustment 
behavior, cannot fully be understood without a prior understanding of the 
theory of public goods, and in particular of one of its most important 
results, the Samuelson/Olson Theorem, which states that in a pure market 
economy with solely individual incentives, the supply of public goods always 
tends to be suboptimal.
Private goods are characterized by rivalry of consumption and technically 
feasible excludability of additional consumers. So we have:
(2)
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where X is the total amount of a purely private good C in a market economy 
hand X is the part of it which goes to the h-th consumer (h = 1,2___,H).
In contrast, the distinctive feature of a purely public good is that it 
cannot be parcelled up this way, and if it is supplied to one possible
consumer, it is supplied to everyone else in the consumer's social or
physical neighborhood. So we can state:
Every consumer receives the same: i.e. the total amount X^ of the public 
good D. Now, what is the optimal supply of a public good as compared to a 
private one?
We consider an economy with a single public good, consumed in quantity G by 
everybody. Unless stated otherwise, we assume public and private goods to be 
normal goods - goods for which higher income means higher demand, and lower 
income lower demand. We want to determine the level of G and the allocation 
vector X ' ¿ I K *  , of n private goods to H consumers (i = l,2,..,n; 
h = 1,2,..,H) which maximizes a social welfare function. We define this 
function as follows.
Let U*1 (X^,G) be the utility function of consumer h, and let V  •' ^  ^
n 1^ 2 3 Hbe Y  (U , U , U , U ) a twice differentiable, concave welfare
function which is monotonically increasing in all its arguments (such a
social welfare function is called an individualistic social welfare
function, since ceteris paribus neither will a decrease in the welfare of
one individual lead to an increased aggregate social welfare, nor will a
higher welfare of one individual result in a lower aggregate social
1 2  1 4  xD = X = X = X = X = X,H (3)
welfare). We want to maximize under the constraint of an aggregate
production function p :‘^n+l which we define as
H
F = F (X,G) with X = 2  Xh ,
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For maximizingjp- a function of several variables - under the constraint of 
F, we have to find a maximum of the corresponding Lagrange function:
£  = y  - X f ( x , g > (4 )
^indicating the auxiliary variable which vanishes thereafter. The first 
order conditions for a maximum of the Lagrangean are
4 «4 •  y « «  &  -
(5)
and
i
(6 )
We can divide the h-th term of (6) by X ^
since it is the same for all h's. After suitably substituting for (5), we 
get:
A 'ù l  / 0 k  )  ■' / r * ;
(7)
for all i's. From conditions (5) and (7) we can derive the characteristics 
of the optimal allocation of public goods as well as private good in x \  the 
marginal rate of substitution must equal the marginal rate of transforma­
tion:
MRS1 .. = MRS2 . . = ......  = MRSH . . = MRT.. (8)
13 13 13 13
for all i,j goods and every consumer h.
Condition (7), on the other hand, states that the sum of the marginal rates 
of substitution between the public good and any private good contained in X
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must equal the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and 
any private good.
X  m s " ig = HRT.a (9)
for all i's. We a re now in a position to state the Samuelson-Olson theorem 
in a precise form:
In a pure market economy with solely individualistic incentives the real 
aggregate demand for any public good which is a normal good, is always 
smaller than the aggregate demand, at which the sum of the individual mar­
ginal rates of substitution between the public good and any private good 
equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and any 
private good:
G i < G ( 2 M R S h . = MRT. ) for all i (10)real £  lg lg
To see why, let us look at the way individual consumers make their adjust­
ment decisions in the economy. The level of consumption of any private good 
depends solely on the individual's preferences and two parameters: the 
budget constraint and the price vector. In contrast to this, the individual 
consumption level of the public good depends also on the adjustments made by 
all other consumers. But if the individual consumer makes his adjustment 
decisions in the same way as he does in the private good case i.e. if other 
consumers' decisions are taken as given and unaffected by one's own expendi­
tures the total supply of the public good will be suboptimal.
To show this, we simplify our model to a two-goods economy with a public 
good, purchased by consumer h in quantity G*1, which comes in quantity 
G = G*1 to everyone; and a private good X*1, which is assumed to be some 
sort of a substitute for the public good or simply a numeraire. We assume 
that all consumers have identical preferences and endowments M*1. For reasons 
of simplicity, we further assume that the public good can be produced at the 
constant marginal cost c^, which is just another way of saying that it can
- 10 -
be purchased at constant unit price. Then each consumer wants to maximize 
his utility function Uh : ^  -> ^
H
Uh (Xh ,G) = Uh (Xh ,Gh + 2 .  Gk ) (11)
such that
Mh = Xh + c Gh m
The Lagrangean function is then:£  = Uh(Xh,Gh + 2. Gk) + "X((Mh - Xh - c Gh) (12)
Since each consumer treats the purchase of the public good by all other con­
sumers as given, we have the following first order conditions:
O ' -  /  U e ,  *  M R S *  ‘  c .to (13)
Each consumer adjusts his consumption bundle in a way that his own MRS 
equals the MRT. The supply of the public good which results from purchases 
made by other consumers affects the individual consumer like a linear shift­
ing of his budget line by a constant factor to the right. The family of 
these new budget lines is given by:
Xh = Mh - c Gh+ c X  Gk , Xh < Mh (14)m m  —
H  H
h k k (Remember that G is a variable, but Z l  G is a constant.) If we let G
gradually increase from zero, for each of its possible values there will be
a point on the shifted budget line which meets condition (13). If we connect
all these points, we get the individual Nash-reaction curve (Figure 1).
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- insert Figure 1 here -
Under the usual assumptions about indifference curves, the individual Nash- 
reaction curve has a positive slope. Now, if Z  G is not fixed, which 
point on the individual Nash-reaction curve will be chosen in an overall 
equilibrium? For consumers with equal endowment and equal preferences, it 
must be the same point on their individual Nash-reaction curves, and this 
point P must meet the condition:
for all h's. This point P on the Nash-reaction curve is the Nash- 
equilibrium, since any unilateral deviation from it will diminish the 
respective consumer’s utility. But P is certainly not a Pareto-optimal sup­
ply level. Since every point on the straight line defined by (15) is 
feasible, the optimal allocation would be P' where
since the marginal cost of transformation of the private into the public 
good now is split equally among the H identical consumers. Given convex in­
difference curves P 1 necessarily lies to the right of P (Figure 2).
If we use the ratio G(P)/G(P') as a measure for the degree of the subop­
timality of supply, we find that the greater the number of consumers 
involved, the greater the degree of suboptimality will be, which is one of 
the important consequences of the Samuelson/Olson Theorem.
Ve may now devise two different types of decision rationality, and consider 
which sort of reaction the two different types of decision rationality in 
our model prescribe for A, if B - by which we indiscriminately mean the rest 
of the group - changes his contribution. Put more formally, we will consider
Xh = Mh - c G/H m (15)
(16)
- insert Figure 2 here -
FIGURE 
(taken
1. The individual Nash-reaction curve 
from Mueller et al. 1987)
FIGURE 2. Nash-equilibrium P and social optimum P 1 
(taken from Mueller et al. 1987)
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A's behavior away from the Nash-equilibrium or the social optimum, respec­
tively.
For both types of decision making, the point of departure is A's individual
demand R (see Figure 3), if no other agent is on the stage.
- insert Figure 3 here -
If the individual consumer makes his adjustment decisions in the same way as 
he does in the private good case i.e. if other consumers' decisions are 
taken as given and unaffected by one's own expenditures, we may call this 
an Individual-Adjustment behavior. Starting from R, an Individual-Adjustment 
behavior prescribes A to decrease his expenditure for the public good, the 
more B spends for it. Whenever B cuts back on his expenditure, A will again 
increase his contribution up to the amount he spends at R. A's reaction 
curve moves from R on upwards - indicating that as he decreases his expendi­
ture for the public good, the more increases - until T, from where on
hr^ £.
A will make no more contributions to the public good, since he is content 
with what he gets for free. The Nash-equilibria - or in Figure 3 - are 
the points where the joint budget line (15) intersects the individual Nash- 
reaction curve. Under the assumptions made, the slope for the Nash-reaction 
curve is positive (non-negative).
A Group-Welfare behavior, on the other hand, acts as if the expenditures of 
all consumers were tightly linked together, as if one single agent - acting 
as a benevolent dictator - determines the total demand and the individual 
expenditures for the public good on the basis of the individual demand func­
tions. If all members of a group have adopted such a behavior, each member 
acts as if his individual demand also determines the total demand of the 
group. We know that only under these conditions a pareto-optimal supply 
level can be achieved. For the moment we will disregard the inherent ex- 
ploitability of this behavior, which in an environment of Individual- 
Adjustment strategists would dwarf all attempts to achieve this goal, and 
assume that B has adopted a Group-Welfare behavior as well. In the case of 
Group-Welfare behavior, A's reaction below the social optimum would be com­
pletely different. The public and the private goods in our model are normal
FIGURE 3. Nash-reaction curve and Group-Welfare-reaction curve 
(taken from Mueller et al. 1987)
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goods, and the private good is specified as a substitute (or a numeraire), 
which means that the cross elasticity of demand for the private good is 
positive (non-negative). Therefore, an increased contribution to the public 
good by B will cause A to increase his contributions as well - up to the 
social optimum at P'. We can also conceive of a reaction curve of A in this 
case. The effect of B taking an increasing interest in the public good will 
be perceived by A as a counter-clockwise move of his budget line from to 
(Figure 3). Connecting all the resulting social optima of A - P'^ and P'2 
in Figure 3 - gives us A's reaction curve for the Group-Welfare behavior 
case. Under the assumptions made, the slope for the Group-Welfare-reaction 
curve is negative (non-positive).
There is an immediate conclusion from these theoretical considerations for 
determining the behavior type a subject applies in a certain situation. To 
categorize a subject we need to know his individual allocation R between the 
public and the private good, as long as there are no other agents on the 
stage, and then his contribution to the public good in the group situation. 
In order to determine the Nash-equilibrium P and the social optimum P', we 
need to know the subject's individual demand function, which in general may 
not be observable. But we can expose the subject to varying levels of con­
tributions made by the other players, forcing our subject into a dynamical 
adjustment process, and then observe the slope of the resulting reaction 
curve. If the slope is negative, we can categorize the subject as a Group- 
Welfare type. If the slope is positive, we may categorize the subject as an 
Individual-Adjustment-type.
Applying the findings from the public goods theory to cooperation games, in 
particular the Prisoner's Dilemma, is not difficult. Mutual cooperation in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma, can be equated with the Pareto-optimal result of 
mutual Group-Welfare behavior, and the suboptimal Nash-equilibrium in the 
game is equivalent to the suboptimal Nash-equilibrium in the economic trans­
action situation. Likewise, Individual-Adjustment behavior is a dominant 
strategy in the economic transaction situation. It is, on the other hand, 
obvious, that in the public goods model noncooerative behavior not neces­
sarily results in zero-expenditure for the public good, which explains the
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difference between the free-riding frequency in experimental markets, and 
the noncooperation frequency in cooperation games, as outlined above.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a special case of a public goods situation, which 
is not only a more general, but also a richer model for the cooperation 
problem. All results from the public goods model are applicable to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as far as they can manifest themselves there at 
all, but not conversely:
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, since the moves in the game are treated as cost 
free, there is no budget constraint. We implicitly assume all players to 
have identical individual aspiration levels R, from which the reaction 
curves to the contributions of the other players take their departure. But 
the individual aspiration level cannot explicitly be considered in the ex­
perimental game, since we have no budget constraint. Second, while the 
public goods situation allows continuous choices, the experimental game al­
lows only binary choices.
We may conclude from this, in investigating the rationality of cooperative 
behavior, that we should switch from analyzing the occurrence of free-riding 
versus non-free-riding to analyzing the occurrence of Individual-Adjustment 
behavior versus Group-Welfare behavior as indicators of non-cooperative, 
non-social behavior versus cooperative, social behavior. Cooperative be­
havior requires much more than simply avoiding free-rides, or even cheap 
rides, since one can spend more than anyone else and still be absolutely 
uninterested in what would be the social optimum for the group. 
Distinguishing free-riding or cheap riding from non-free-riding nurtures the 
notion that free-riding is a pathology, a deviance from the norm of non­
free-riding. Focusing instead on the suggested distinction between 
Individual-Adjustment behavior versus Group-Welfare behavior makes it clear 
that both represent, in some way, types of rational behavior, and only ra­
tional expectations about the social cohesion of the action context 
determine which one to prefer.
These rational expectations are the key to understanding the evolution of 
cooperation. They do not simply refer to a probability distribution over 
other people's future behavior moves. Experiments in which real subjects
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played the Prisoner's Dilemma or related games against a simulated, pre­
programmed partner showed indeed that a large proportion of subjects tended 
to exploit unconditionally cooperative behavior (as an overview see Colman, 
1982: 123f. and Isaac et al., 1985).
Political philosophers have always been aware that only the expectation of 
conditionally cooperative behavior - conditional upon the partner's 
demonstrated cooperativeness - can elicit stable cooperative behavior. This 
reciprocity of reward and retaliation has been made the crucial point of all 
formal models described in the literature on the evolution of cooperation 
(Grofeman and Pool, 1976; Smale, 1980; Axelrod, 1981, 1984; Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981). A central result from this literature is that the higher 
the social cohesion - namely:
(i) the expected length of interaction sequences,
(ii) the reliability of information about other players' actions,
(iii) the certainty of rewards and retaliations
- the greater the chances for mutually stable cooperation to emerge. The 
obvious model for studying the effects of various degrees of social cohesion 
is iterated games with an indefinite number of iterations (supergames). 
Every game or market transaction as analyzed above would be an elementary 
game of such a supergame.
In order to be evolutionärily successful, Group-Welfare behavior in the 
elementary games must be an equilibrium strategy in the respective super­
game. The fascinating thing here is that continuous Group-Welfare behavior 
in elementary games can be an evolutionarily stable Individual-Adjustment 
behavior in the supergame. The conditions under which this can occur are 
scrutinized in the literature cited.
From the subjective perspective of the individual decision-maker, the op­
timal choice in supergames hinges on his rational expectations concerning 
the social cohesion of the group. If the social cohesion, including mutual 
information, of the group is high, Group-Welfare behavior on the part of the 
others will stimulate me to behave in the same way. If I know that the 
others will display Group-Welfare behavior if and only if I display Group- 
Welfare behavior, then it is rational to actually display Group-Welfare
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behavior. If the social cohesion of the group is low, and I cannot expect 
that the others will display Group-Welfare behavior if I display Group- 
Welfare behavior, then it is rational to display Individual-Adjustment 
behavior. An experimental expression of the reciprocity of the rational ex­
pectations can be found in the high correlation between the self-rated 
behavior type of subjects and the behavior type attribution subjects make 
with regard to the other players in the group (Kelley and Strahelski, 1970a, 
1970b, 1970c). The two decision behavior types - Individual-Adjustment be­
havior and Group-Welfare behavior - are more than just theoretically derived 
extreme positions, between which, in reality, every mixture is possible. The 
occurrence of the two clearly distinguishable behavior types of 
'competitors' and ’cooperators' can be explained on theoretical ground: any 
equilibrium between non-cooperative and conditionally cooperative strategies 
in cooperation games is unstable (Mueller, 1986, 1987).
III.
3.) The key to understanding people's decisions in social dilemmata are 
their expectations regarding the decisions of the other players- Therefore, 
a major focus of interest should be measuring these expectations of subjects 
in experiments, and investigating the rationality of these expectations.
Measuring of subjective probabilities raises difficult methodological and 
theoretical problems.
a) Axiomatic probability theory expresses the probability of an event or a 
set of events by a real number on the closed interval between zero and one. 
The probability concepts of natural languages (possible, probable, im­
probable, a real chance that ...), on the other hand, have a vague meaning. 
Specific research overwhelmingly has demonstrated that ascribing of ap­
propriate (in terms of axiomatic probability theory) numerical values to 
probability concepts of natural languages varies extremely not only between 
subjects, but also within subjects over time (see as an overview Wallsten et 
al. 1986). In addition, the probability concepts of natural languages widely 
overlap in these numerical ascription.
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A solution to this problem can be found in ideas developed by Watson et al. 
1979, Zimmer 1983, and Wallsten et al. 1986. The meaning of natural language 
probability concepts is expressed as an argument of membership functions. 
Membership functions have been introduced in the theory of fuzzy sets, and 
one defined as a maping of every element m of a set M into the closed inter­
val between zero and one. The argument of this maping expresses the degree 
to which this element m of N belongs also to another set N. If m certainly 
is not a member of N, then the membership function has the value zero; if m 
certainly is a member of N, the value is one; values are in between other­
wise.
A membership function can serve to express how well - in the judgement of a 
subject - the points on the closed interval between zero and one represent a 
certain natural language probability concept. In a series of technically 
very sophisticated experiments Wallsten et al. (1986) have shown, that the 
measuring of natural language probability terms with such membership func­
tions is at least within subjects relatively stable over time.
We should energetically utilize these ideas for experimental social dilemma 
research. A first step would be to test whether natural language probability 
terms mean the same if applied to physical and to social uncertainties.
b) Subjects with a formal education, even with a specific mathematical 
training have been shown to be surprisingly inconsistent in cognitively 
processing subjective probabilities, committing all sorts of errors - as 
seen not only from classical expected utility theory, but also from 
axiomatic probability theory. Notable examples of violations of the latter 
are the insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes or to sample size, 
the misperception of chance in small samples or of the effects of regres­
sion, or the biases in the evaluation of conjunctive events. (According to 
axiomatic probability theory, for A + B, p ( A H  B) < p(A), p(B)). This line 
of research, however, for which Kahneman and Tversky stand as the most 
prominent representatives (Kahneman et al. 1982) has not developed a theory 
yet why people are behaving that way.
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The path towards such a theory may be opened by the observation that sub­
jects, applying certain general rules of conversation (be specific, be 
relevant, be new etc.) tend to interpret given probability attributions on 
the most specific level possible. (Such rules were first formulated by Grice 
1975. An application to probability reasoning can be found in Hilton 1988) .
Let, as an example, a subject be given some information about emotional and 
personal qualities of a fictitious person called Fritz, and then ask the 
subject for the probability that Fritz is I) “a lawyer" or II) "a lawyer and 
an activist in leftist organizations". Clearly, p (I) >_ p(II) according to 
axiomatic probability theory, but not if subjects interpret (I) - in the 
light of the information given in (II) - as "Fritz is a lawyer and not an 
activist in leftist organizations".
In general, if people interpret p(A) - in the light of the possibility of 
the event (A Pi B) - as P (A Cl B ) , then it is not impossible that subjects 
indeed estimate p(A) <_ p(A Pi B) (Morier and Borgida 1984).
If it could be demonstrated also for other areas of alleged logical mistakes 
in probability reasoning, that these mistakes vanish as such once we assume 
that people process the given information according to these general rules 
of conversation, then again we should look for the evolutionary rationality 
of these general rules of conversation, as the key to human reasoning and 
decision making in this field. A sensible first step could be again finding 
out whether subjects differ in their respective probability reasoning with 
regard for their social or their physical environment.
In addition, there is a principal obstacle to any measurement of expecta­
tions, which has been the game theoretical centerpiece of the "rational 
expectations" revolution in macroeconomics.
Let us assume that a player A has correct expectations concerning the 
strategies which the other players intend to apply. The expectations are, 
technically speaking, subjective probability distributions about the choice 
of strategies by the other players. From these probability distributions the 
rational choice of o n e’s own strategies can be derived. If, however, the 
other players know player A's subjective probability distribution, they will
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stick to their original choice {the one expected by A) only if their 
original choice is at the same time an equilibrium strategy and a pure 
strategy. The reason for this is that to every fixed choice of strategies by 
another player there exists a best reply strategy for A from A's available 
set of pure strategies, which yields to A at least as much as every possible 
mixed equilibrium strategy.
That means: in any situation which does not unequivocally call for a certain 
course of action, knowledge of my subjective expectations concerning other 
players’ actions may dramatically alter exact those actions to be taken by 
other players.
The central message of the "Rational Expectations" revolution in macro­
economics refers exactly to this: agents on the marketplace form 
expectations about the present expectations and future actions of others; 
these expectations can efficiently neutralize the future actions taken by 
others, or may lead to consequences of these future actions which were not 
intended by their initiators. The better informed agents are, and the better 
their foresight is, the less effective, for example, any government or 
central bank interventions on markets might become.
Everybody knows from one’s own life experience, that there are expectations 
which are more likely to come true if you communicate them {"One day you, 
too, will betray me") while there are others, which are less likely to come 
true if you communicate them {"In five years from now, I will be sitting in 
your chair, boss"). In all those cases it is rational not to communicate 
one's true expectations. In accordance with this one can experimentally ob­
serve, that subjects in social dilemma situations, after being questioned 
about their expectations concerning future decisions by other players, 
change their own decisions in a consistent way thereafter (Sniziek 1988) .
This poses a serious methodological problem for the designing of our experi­
ments. In many cases, I suspect, we would be well advised, to treat our 
subjects’ expectations as unobservable variables, because any effort to ob­
serve them may substantially alter them.
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IV.
It is the basic conviction of classical microeconomics that, given perfect 
competition and perfect information, there is a unique equilibrium for every 
firm and every private household, which unequivocally determines the choices 
a rational decision maker might want to make in order to maximize his 
utility. Things change, however, once we turn to non-stationary markets or 
to markets with incomplete competition or incomplete information.
In markets with incomplete information, i.e. if not all agents on the 
marketplace have the same information, there can be many, or even a con­
tinuum of equilibria. As an example: Let us assume that potential employers 
cannot assess the actual abilities of an individual employee, all they can 
do is taking notice of the employers formal educational achievements. Every 
employee is paid according to the productivity of an average person of his 
or her formal education. If there is also a market for educational services, 
then in the market equilibrium prices and supply of these services will be 
such that the net value of all levels of formal education (gross life income 
minus cost of the education) is the same. Given such a market equilibrium, 
every individual demand for education is in the household equilibrium: for 
whatever investment in his or her education a young person opts, his or her 
life net income will be the same (The empirical facts, by the way, do not 
support this conclusion).
The more equilibria there are, the smaller is the explanatory value of the 
classical rational choice model, and with a continuum of equilibria this 
value has vanished altogether. Given incomplete or non-stationary markets 
knowledge of market prices alone does not suffice to guarantee rational 
choices. A monopolist or oligopolist, for example, must not only know factor 
prices and the prices of his products on the market, he must know the demand 
and production functions of all consumers and factor suppliers as well, in 
order to make a rational decision on the optimal level of production.
In non-stationary markets present prices are no unbiased estimators of fu­
ture prices. Under these conditions, perfect knowledge of future prices 
requires that the agents have a correct and complete model of the economy in 
their heads. If they don't, and if the models which they have in their
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heads, differ from each other, again there may be a multitude or even a con­
tinuum of market equilibria.
The consequences of all this are clear: The classical rational choice model 
has not denied that individual decision making and collective approaching of 
equilibria are not instant events, but time-consuming processes. But it 
neglected the process character of rational choices for if the end point of 
such a process is given, the single steps this process may take are ir­
relevant .
In this viewpoint, there is no need either to look into the strategies 
agents apply in approaching an equilibrium, be it by explicit or implicit 
bargaining, or by individually finding out, what the best price is for one's 
products. Even if there are different paths such adjustment processes take, 
they are equifinal.
4.) As soon as adjustment processes are no more equifinal (because there are 
many possible endpoints, which equally qualify as rational results) the 
rationality of individual decision making as well as of the market dynamics 
as a whole lies in the process itself of reaching some equilibrium. If we 
mean by bargaining any process by which individual players come to a conver­
gence of wishes and offerings, then scrutinizing the rationality of the 
bargaining strategies which on the marketplace the agents apply is the only 
way to investigate the rationality of the results of the whole process.
We have to admit that present bargaining theory by no means provides the 
well-developed concept of a process rationality which we would like to have 
for the designing of our experiments. This is so mainly because the various 
approaches within bargaining theory agreed in one thing: taking as the 
criterion for any bargaining principle's efficiency not i t’s procedural 
stability, it's dynamic dominance over competing bargaining strategies, but 
instead, whether it maximized the final output. Given the usual assumptions 
on preferences and utility functions, the equilibrium which maximizes the 
final output of a bargaining process then is unique.
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This general way of approaching the problem neglects the central feature of 
bargaining. In a complex setting it is nonsense to judge the efficiency of a 
bargaining strategy by whether it leads to the unique optimal outcome. How 
can one determine this one outcome, even in retrospective? How finely tuned 
is it? What really matters is, that a bargaining strategy leads to an ac­
ceptable outcome, which meets certain minimal requirements, and accomplishes 
this in a robust way, which cannot be beaten by alternative bargaining 
strategies.
Any bargaining situation is characterized by the indeterminacy of the out­
come. If we have a multiple or dense set of equilibrium points, then a 
theory of bargaining should explain, how well certain bargaining strategies 
are doing against each other, which bargaining strategies do reach a 
specific equilibrium point? What use can be made of a bargaining strategy 
which can reach this specific equilibrium point, when paired against some 
strategies, while it is hopelessly outsmarted by some other strategies, even 
if the latter benefit their players less well.
But this exactly characterizes the axiomatic approach which from the onset 
on until very recently has dominated bargaining theory. This approach can be 
summarized as follows:
There is a group of n agents, and a bargaining problem: in a given situation 
the agents have some alternatives, available through some joint action. Any 
alternative yields agent i utility IK, with 0 <_ IK IK . The agents' 
preferences over their alternatives conflict, which is just another way of 
saying that there is a multitude of equilibrium points in this situation. If 
we allow mixed strategies, then under usual assumptions we have a convex set 
S in J with the Pareto-optimal part S' of the boundary of S as the set of 
all possible results of the bargaining process.
A solution of this bargaining problem is a function, which selects one par­
ticular result - a Pareto-optimal equilibrium point - from S', which 
represents an '’acceptable balance between the agents1 respective aspirations 
and sacrifices" {Thomson 1985, 235), and which therefore is the recommended 
optimal alternative.
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Clearly the criteria of what the recommended optimal alternative should be 
are not derived from the initial properties of the bargaining problem, they 
are independently and exogeneously added to it. Several such criteria for 
solutions have been considered in the literature, among them:
n
- The Nash solution N(S') which uniquely maximizes T F u ^
- the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ( S’), which is the maximal feasible point
in S' on the line, which connects the origin to the "point of milk and
honey" a(S) where for each i, a.{S)=U.1 i,max
- the egalitarian solution with U.= U. for all i and i, and U.,U. = S.i 3 i J
(see Figure 4)
- insert Figure 4 here -
This axiomatic approach (Thomson 237) in bargaining theory suffers from 
three basic flaws:
1.) The recommended unique result is an equilibrium, but getting there is 
not necessarily a dominant strategy for all agents. Therefore agents have to 
enter a binding agreement on actually enforcing the recommended result. This 
in turn presupposes an institutional context, in which binding contracts are 
enforcible. This precondition, however, can hardly be assumed in every 
natural setting.
2.) All the mentioned criteria - Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, egalitarian - im­
plicitly presuppose that interpersonal utility comparisons are meaningful. 
Decades of dispute have taught us, that there is no hope of ever defining an 
absolute measure of interpersonal utility. All we can hope for is a relative 
measure, like fitness in biological evolution theory. But then diminishing 
other players utility ipso facto increases one's own utility, and vice 
versa, with the effect that the whole notion of Pareto-optimality would have 
to be redefined.
3.) The third and most serious shortcoming is the one we already mentioned. 
Even if we could satisfactorily justify a criterion which uniquely defines 
an optimal bargaining result, why should bargaining strategies, which yield
Agent  2
\ï|*2=k
S \  A q e n l I
FIGURE 4.
a) N a s h - s o l u t i o n ;
b) Kalai-Srnorodinsky solution;
c) Egalitarian-solution.
(taken from Thomson 1985)
(c)
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this result, at the same time necessarily be resilient against all other 
alternative bargaining strategies. But this robustness is crucial in a 
world, in which evolutionary success hinges not on getting most in absolute 
terms, but rather on getting more than your competitors.
The other important approach in bargaining theory, the strategic approach, 
enjoys several advantages over the axiomatic approach. Rather than recom­
mending an outcome, this approach recommends a strategy how to proceed step 
by step in a sequence of offers, and decisions to accept or reject these 
offers. But most models within this approach as still stuck halfway from the 
axiomatic theory of bargaining to a genuinely process oriented theory of 
bargaining, which looks for the efficiency of bargaining in the path the 
bargaining sequence takes, and not in it's final results.
Probably the best known of these models is the Zeuthen-Harsanyi model of 
bilateral bargaining: In a bargaining process players 1 and 2 either reach 
an agreement A or a conflict C arises, with payoffs IL(A) or U^(C), respec­
tively, i = 1,2.
Bargaining proceeds stepwise, at step k player 1 offers an agreement A . , and 
player 2 offers an agreement A^. We assume these offers to be meaningful, 
i.e.
U.iC) < U.<Ak) < U.(A*) (17)l l j l l
i, j = 1,2 und i + j.
Each player prefers his own last offer over the last offer of the opponent 
player. Each player, however, makes only offerings, which benefit also the 
other side at least as much as the conflict outcome.
k kAs long as A^ = A2 , each player i has three options for step k+1:
a) he can repeat his last offer A.;
1b) he can accept the opponent's last offer A^;
- 25 -
k+1c) he can come up with a new offer A. which benefits himself less, but the
k  ^opponent more than A ^ :
V if 4-i y
U.(A.) < U .(A. L) < U .(A.) (18)3 1 3 1 3 3
irul?) < u .(a *+1) < u± caJ) (19)
A new offering of this kind is called a concession.
Step k+1 may result in the following:
aa) no player makes a concession, bargaining is terminated, and conflict 
arises;
ab) one of the two players accepts the opponent's last offer;
bb) both players accept the respective opponent's last offer, an eventual 
surplus is split up among the players according to some rule (f.e. the 
rule of equality);
ac) the bargaining process moves toward step k+2; 
be) this case leads to the same result as bb); 
cc) the bargaining process moves toward step k+2.
Zeuthen's principle tries to answer the question, when you - in cases ac) 
and cc) - should make a concession at step k+2, and if so, of what size, and 
when you should make no concession.
According to Zeuthen, in general you should make a concession, if you should 
be less willing to terminate the bargaining process:
If player i accepts player's j last offer, bargaining is terminated with
k k payoff U .(A.). If player i insists on A., player j can either terminate the 1 3 i ^
bargaining process - with payoffs U,(C) and U.(C) - or he can accept A. with 
k 1 3  1
payoff Uj(A^). Let us assume that player i expects player j to terminate the
bargaining process at this step with probability p.(i). Then a reasonable
k ^player i will insists on his own last offer A^, only if
(l-p..(i)) U.(Ak) + p . (i) U.(C) > U.(Ak) 31 1 1  3 1 1 3 (20)
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Pj(i) = < (U±(A^) - Ui (Aj))/(i (A^) - U±(C)) (21)
This subjective probability p.(i) = r^ indicates the maximal risk player i 
should be willing to run, if he considers enforcing an agreement on the 
basis of his last offer. At the same time, r^ is a measure for player’s i 
incentive, to prefer the risk of conflict over the result of his own giving
Zeuthen's principle advises player i to make a concession if r^ < r^, and
to insist on his last offer, if r. > r.. If r. = r. then both should makei J 1 3
concessions at step k+2.
Zeuthen’s principle does not tell anything about the size of eventual con­
cessions .
The appeal of Zeuthen's principle stems not at least from the fact that it 
allows to realize possible gains in a bargaining situation step-by-step, 
that is, no binding contracts are necessary in order to implement the ter­
minal solution (as it is the case in the axiomatic approach models).
Zeuthen did not care about justifing the efficiency of his principle, which 
he thought to be intuitively convincing. Harsanyi (1977) was able to 
demonstrate that if correctly applied by both players, Zeuthen's principle 
leads to Nash's solution to the bargaining problem (see above).
Any bargaining model must take into account the possibility that the bar­
gaining process is terminated - by a miscalculation of the players or some 
outside world event - before the Pareto-front is reached. We should expect 
from an efficient bargaining strategy that it is sequentially rational in 
the sense that it is not dominated by some other bargaining strategy at any 
time during the bargaining process {see Cramton 1985, who defines sequential 
rationality slightly differently). It has not, however, been demonstrated 
that Zeuthen's principle is sequentially rational.
i.e. if
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Rubinstein (1982) has devised a simple bargaining model which meets this 
objection. There is a cake of size 1, if the two players 1 and 2 agree on a 
partition of the cake, they receive their agreed share. If they fail to 
agree, they get nothing. Obviously, any partition of the cake is an equi­
librium. The bargaining process goes as follows:
At time 0 player 1 proposes that a share of size x goes to him, player 2 
accepts or rejects this proposal. If player 2 does not accept, at time 1 it 
is player's 2 turn to make a proposal which player 1 can accept or reject, 
and so on.
An important new aspect of the model is that in order to provide some incen­
tive for the players to reach an agreement in time, the payoff to players is
their agreed share multiplied with some discount factor dj and d!L respec- 
t ttively, with 0 < d^, d^ < 1 for all t. These discount factors reflect the 
players' impatience, or their valuation of time per se.
A strategy in this bargaining game is a rule which prescribes as 
proposal/reply sequence as a function of the history of the bargaining 
process up to that point. Rubinstein (1982) could show that in this bargain­
ing game there is a partition of the cake which is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, namely player 1 receives a payoff (1 - d2)/(l - and
player 2 receives ” d^)/(l - d^d2). The apparent "unfairness" of this
solution (for d^ = d2 , player 2 receives less than player 1) can be disposed 
of by a rule that a coin is tossed in order to determine who starts the bar­
gaining process.
Subgame perfectness means for player 1 as well as for player 2: proposing 
this partition is an equilibrium strategy not only for the original bargain­
ing game but also for every subgame of it. Thus, this strategy is 
sequentially rational as defined above, but it is still open, whether it 
retains this property once we assume that player 1 does not know exactly 
player's 2 discount factor, but has only a subjective probability distribu­
tion over it.
In any case, simple as it is, Rubinsteins's model with the sequential 
rationality of the strategy it recommends shows us the direction to go (see 
also Roth 1985, Sutton 1986): devise sequentially rational bargaining 
strategies, and then have them tested in experiments: whether naive subjects
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apply then spontaneously, and how naive subjects bargain when paired against 
them. This brings me to my last recommendation:
V.
5.) Once we adopt a process oriented notion of rationality, as outlined, we 
have to put the analysis of our subjects' bargaining behavior, which means 
the reconstruction of the bargaining strategies, applied by the players, 
into the center stage of experimental social dilemma research. The ex­
perimental design of choice for this analysis are bargaining games between a 
real subject and a group of computer simulated bargaining partners.
Bargaining behavior is something very reflexive- A player’s present move is 
a response to all the previous moves of the other players, which in turn are 
responses to the even earlier moves by all players, and so on. Given the 
huge variance in these data, it seems to be practically impossible to test 
any non-trivial theory of bargaining in real groups with several real sub­
jects. We can overcome this problem only, if we set up experiments in which 
we control the bargaining strategies of all players save one, in order to 
have all remaining variance, which can be observed in the bargaining se­
quence, caused by the step-by-step decision of this one remaining subject.
Either we have the means to train bargaining partners to such a degree, that 
we can be sure that they even in long bargaining sequences strictly apply a 
specific bargaining strategy (which has to provide rules for every contin­
gency by the other players), which we have determined beforehand. Or - and I 
think, this is the obvious choice - we have all bargaining partners being 
simulated by a computer program save one - the one real subject. Here we can 
have the simulated partners play arbitrarily complicated bargaining 
strategies under completely controlled conditions. All the systematic 
variance (we can include stochastic elements in the simulated partners' 
strategies) in the bargaining sequence data is then due to the one real sub­
ject. We can expect a broad horizon of interesting results, unobtainable 
without this technique, which has the potential to dramatically contribute 
to the future development of our area of study.
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Progress in methodology, however, must go hand in hand with progress in 
theory. It would be senseless to have the simulated bargaining partners ap­
ply inefficient bargaining strategies.
Once all partners in a bargaining process have the same endowment and the 
same interests, no bargaining strategy can be rational which is not a best 
reply to itself. In many aspects, however, one can expect only trivial 
results from a bargaining experiment in which the most rational course of 
action for a real subject is simply to do what the simulated bargaining 
partners do. On the other hand, if the best reply to what the simulated 
partners play is some other bargaining strategy, it easily can require a lot 
of intellectual effort determine what the best reply exactly is, and, even 
more difficult, how far other-than-best replies actually are off the mark. 
Such a theoretical understanding is the inevitable prerequisite for the 
measuring the rationality of real subjects’ empirical bargaining strategies. 
Another problem is that the bargaining strategy which a subject applies, can 
never be determined absolutely exactly from the empirical sequence of bar­
gaining moves. In general we can only derive to what class of bargaining 
strategy a real subjects' strategy actually belongs.
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